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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.

vs.

12259

JUAN P. JARAMILLO,
Defend.ant-Appellant.

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Appeal from Appellant's conviction of robbery in
violation of Section 76-51-1, Utah Code Annotated
(1953) in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
After Appellant was released by federal habeas
corpus from the commitment of his first prosecution, he
1
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was retried before a jury for the crime of robbery. Ht
was found guilty on June 3, 1970, and sentenced on June
30, 1970, to an indeterminate term as provided by law
for the crime of robbery.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment entered
by the lower court and a new trial with instructions to
allow the jury to make a finding of fact as to if Appellant
should be acquitted on grounds of former jeopardy.
In the alternative, Appellant seeks a remand of the
case to the lower Court with instructions that the commitment be modified to give credit for all time Appellant has been incarcerated since his arrest.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 27, 1967, Appellant was arrested on
the charge of robbery. Appellant is indigent, and being
unable to raise bail at any time, he has been in continuous
incarceration since November 27, 1967. He originally
entered a plea of not guilty, but his impatience overcame
his desire to litigate the issue of his innocence when it
became apparent to him that the State was denying him
his right to a speedy trial and he was spending "dead
time" in the County Jail for which he anticipated no
credit if convicted. On February 13, 1968, Appellant
therefore changed his plea to guilty and waived time for
2
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passing of sentence, whereupon judgment and sentence
were pronounced.
On April 23, 1970, the Honorable A. Sherman
Christensen, Judge in the United States District Court
for the District of Utah, Central Division, granted Appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on the
grounds that his plea of guilty had not been an intelligent and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights.
Appellant was subsequently retried for the same
offense of robbery before the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Third District Court for Salt Lake County, the
Court from which the present appeal is being made. At
this second prosecution, Appellant entered pleas of not
guilty and former jeopardy. In connection with his defense of former jeopardy, Appellant wished to present
evidence to the effect that he had been incarcerated in
excess of 30 months as a consequence of the charge for
which he was being tried; that 271h months had been
spent in state prison; and that as a practical matter, such
periods of time approach the minimum time served for
convictions for robbery. Over Appellant's exception, the
trial judge did not allow Appellant to present this evidence and refused to submit the issue of former jeopardy
to the jury.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and Appellant was subsequently sentenced to an indeterminate
term as provided by law for the crime of robbery.

3
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POINT I
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANT THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE OF FORMER JEOPARDY AND IN
FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY OX
THE ISSUE OF FORMER JEOPARDY.
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12, provides that no person shall "be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense." This same right is provided by statute,
77-1-10, Utah Code Annotated (1953).
The prohibition against double jeopardy is guar·
anteed by the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Fifth Amendment double jeopardy standards are enforceable against the states through the Four·
teenth Amendment. Benton vs. Maryland 395 U.S. 784
( 1969).

Double jeopardy does not generally act as an abso·
lute bar to the re trail of a defendant who successfully
attacks his first prosecution. The rational for this prin·
ciple ". . . rests ultimately upon the premise that the
original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been
wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean. As to what·
ever punishment has actually been suffered under the
first conviction, that premise is, of course, an unmiti·
gated fiction ... " North Carolina vs. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, at 721 ( 1969).
Thus, the fiction of waiver might not infringe on a
defendant's constitution right if it operates to waive the
4
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jeopardy defense only in the context of prosecution. But
to the extent punishment, as opposed to prosecution, constitutes jeopardy, even the most callus individual would
have trouble digesting the notion that 30 months of incarceration can be wiped off the slate by the granting of
a new trial.
The Fifth Amendment concept of jeopardy includes the imposition of punishment as well as subjection to prosecution. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163
(1873).

The holding in Pearce, supra and infra, clearly
demonstrates that the slate is not "wiped clean" to the
extent that punishment has already been exacted, and
the right to a crediting for such punishment is not waived
when a defendant seeks release from the commitment
of a first prosecution.
An issue of fact arises upon a plea of once in jeopardy. 77-27-1 (3), Utah Code Annotated (1953). Issues
of fact must be tried by the jury. 77-27-2, Utah Code
Annotated ( 1953) .
Since the time served by Appellant prior to his
second prosecution constituted jeopardy, and since he
did not waive his right to the defense of former jeopardy,
the trial court erred in disallowing evidence of former
jeopardy and in not submitting the issue to the jury.

5
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POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING
THE INDETERMINATE STATUTORY PEN.
ALTY FOR ROBBERY, WITHOUT GIVING
CREDIT IN THE COMMITMENT FOR THI
TIME ALREADY SERVED BY APPELLANT

InNorthCarolinavs.Pearce,395 U.S. 711 (1969)
petitioner was convicted of assault with intent to rap1
and sentenced to a prison term of 12 to 15 years. Severa
years later his conviction was reversed on the ground
of the unconstitutional use of his confession. He was re
tried, convicted, and sentenced to eight years, whicl
when added to the time he had already served amounte1
to a longer sentence than imposed at his first trial. Th
case reached the United States Supreme Court throug:
a federal habeas corpus proceeding which Pearce init1
ated.

The Supreme Court held that the "constitutiom
guarantee against multiple punishments for the sarn
offense absolutely requires that punishment alread
exacted must be fully 'credited' in imposing sentenc
upon a new conviction for the same offense." 395 u.:
at 718-19.

Pearce requires that time served be credited wh€
imposing sentence. In terms of the opinion of the cou
in Pearce, multiple punishment is exacted "whenev1
punishment already endured is not fully subtracted fro
any new sentence imposed." 395 U.S. at 718.
6
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Appellant further contends that under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, credit
must also be given Appellant for the time prior to his
first prosecution, spent in county jail because of his inability to meet the bail set. If time is not credited to Appellant for the two and one-half months spent in county
jail awaiting trial, then he is being discriminated against
on the basis of his financial inability to post bail.
Appellant's argument is supported by Williams vs.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 {1970). In Williams the United
States Supreme Court held that where a fine is imposed
in addition to a maximum sentence, it is a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to imprison a convicted defendant beyond the period of the original sentence by reason of his inability to
pay the fine.
JVilliams is distinguishable from the instant case in
that Williams involved tacking time on to the end of a
maximum sentence, rather than on the beginning of an
indeterminate sentence, and dealt with the payment of
fines, not bail. But neither of these distinguishable facts
can rationally distinguish the underlying policy in Williams as applied to Appellant's situation.
The determinative factor in Williams is that different consequences were being imposed on different defendants based on their financial ability. This same factor is present in the instant case.
In fact, there is an element present in Appellant's

7
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case which makes the law even more discriminatin~
toward Appellant than the appellant in Williams. If a
convicted defendant pays a fine to avoid the extension
of imprisonment be•1f)nd the maximum sentence, that
defendant has given .ip something and to some extent i)
on a common footing with the indigent who is f orceJ
into extended incarceration by reason of inability to pay
the fine. Where a maximum sentence has been imposed,
Williams held that such a common footing is not suffi.
cient to avoid a violation of equal protection. A fortiori
there is a violation of equal protection where a defendant
who is unable to make bail is not allowed credit toward
his commitment for time spent in county jail, for in thi~
case the class of people who are able to make bail may
get by with giving up nothing but the use of their ball
money until it is refunded upon their appearance.

CONCLUSIONS
The trial judge erred in not allowing Appellant to
offer evidence of the extent of his former jeopardy and
in not submitting the issue of jeopardy to the jury. This
error was prejudicial since it precluded Appellant from
asserting a defense guaranteed him by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constl·
tution and by the Utah Constitution and the statutes of
Utah.
The trial judge violated Appellant's Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights when he imposed the
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statutory indeterminate sentence without crediting Appellant for time served.
Respectfully c;ubmitted,
VAN SCIVER, FLORENCE,
HUTCHISON, & SHARP
Robert Van Seiver
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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